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Conventions are regularities in social behaviour of the
past that enable us to coordinate our actions. Some con-
ventions are lawlike: they are expected to be observed
always or nearly always. However, in order to coordi-
nate our actions, it may suffice that a precedent has
occurred often enough, and sometimes even a single
precedent will do. So, in general, conventions merely
enable us to solve our coordination problems; lawlike
conventions are a special case. Grammatical conventions
are often lawlike; sense conventions are typically
enabling. In order to resolve the indeterminacies that
sense conventions give rise to, interlocutors must rely
on the common ground. In this and other ways, com-
mon ground is a prerequisite for convention-based
communication.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Syntactic rules, words and their meanings, phoneme inventories: they all vary from language to lan-
guage, and are therefore a matter of convention. Plato’s Cratylus dialogue shows that this claim used
to be controversial, but that was a while ago; since then there has long been a comfortable consensus
in favour of the conventionalist view. This is not to deny that there are non-conventional constraints
on the emergence and development of language, but it is to say that they fall far short of determin-
ing these processes.
What does it mean for a language to be conventional? Conventions are patterns in social interac-
tion, like driving on the right or shaking hands. The languages studied by phonologists, lexicolo-
gists, and syntacticians are abstract, many-layered systems, and it is by no means obvious that such
systems qualify as patterns in social interaction on a par with shaking hands or driving on the right.
Lewis frames the issue as follows:
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Suppose that with practice we could adopt any language in some wide range. It matters
comparatively little to anyone (in the long run) what language he adopts, as long as he
and those around him adopt the same language and can communicate easily. Each
must choose what language to adopt according to his expectations about his neighbors’
language: English among English speakers, Welsh among Welsh speakers, Esperanto
among Esperanto speakers, and so on. (Lewis, 1969, pp. 7–8)
More formally, let “languages” be mappings from sentences to sentence meanings
(e.g., propositions), and let “language” be a social activity. Then Lewis’s question is: How are lan-
guages and language related? Lewis (1975) seeks to answer this question by defining what it means
for a population P to “use a language L”:
A population P uses a language L iff there is in P a convention of truthfulness and trust
in L.
That is to say, if P-speakers generally avoid uttering false L-sentences and P-hearers generally
accept utterances of L-sentences as true, then P uses L in Lewis’s designated sense of the word.
These proclivities count as conventional because, in principle, they could have been directed at a
language other than L.
While Lewis’s account has been criticised by Hawthorne (1990) and others for failing to provide
a satisfactory answer to the question of when a population uses a language, my worry is with the
question itself. For one thing, if we adopt a generative stance on languages, as Lewis does, then it is
by no means obvious that speakers use languages at all; for on this view a language is infinitely
large, and only a fraction of its sentences are short and simple enough ever to be produced and
understood. Apart from that, there are obvious concerns about context dependence, rampant ambigu-
ity, and variation within and between speakers; all of which militate against the idea that people use
languages in Lewis’s sense. But more importantly, we would like to know what it means for a word,
syntactic construction, or stress pattern to be conventionally used in such-and-such a way. Lewis
does not tell us that, and does not mean to either; indeed, he denies that the rules of syntax and
semantics are conventional (1975, p. 24). Lewis’s objective is merely to specify the conditions under
which a population may be said to use a language, and his proposal effectively treats sentences as
atoms, leaving sub-sentential units out of account.
A more promising approach, I submit, is to proceed bottom up, starting with the phonemes,
words, constructions, intonation contours, and so on. Like traffic lights and handshakes, these lin-
guistic building blocks are devices that we conventionally use to regulate our social interactions.
They are more like handshakes than traffic lights in that they are instantiated by short-lived actions
which may serve as precedents for future actions. Conventions are just precedent types which have
gained momentum through frequency of use. Hence, in order to understand how linguistic conven-
tions work, we must first learn to understand how precedents work. But before turning to that topic,
I will comply with the standard protocol, in discussions of conventions, and register my main points
of agreement and disagreement with Lewis’s (1969) celebrated analysis.
2 | CONVENTIONS AND PRECEDENTS
On Lewis’s account, the purpose of a convention is to solve a coordination problem, like sharing
roads, for example. There are two obvious ways of regulating traffic so as to maximise efficiency
and minimise loss of life and property: people driving in the same direction should either keep all to
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the left or keep all to the right. It does not matter which solution is adopted, as long as it is the same
for all. It is not good enough that most drivers keep to the right; general conformity is best. Finally,
everyone’s expectation that everybody else drives on the right gives me a compelling reason to drive
on the right myself. Generalising from these observations, Lewis proposes the following analysis:
A behavioural regularity R is a convention in a population P iff it is common ground
among P’s members that:
• Everyone conforms to R.
• The belief that the others conform to R gives everyone a decisive reason to conform to R
himself.
• There is a general preference for general conformity to R.
• R is not the only possible regularity meeting the last two conditions. (Conventions are
arbitrary.)
Although practically every part of Lewis’s theory has been under attack (Rescorla, 2014), my
general impression is that it has withstood the test of time remarkably well, and that its main flaw is
that it is too narrow in some respects. Put otherwise, it seems to me that, at the very least, Lewis
conventions are an important special case. I will discuss three points on which Lewis’s account has
been criticised.
First, Lewis’s theory of conventions has been lambasted for relying on the notion of common
ground, or “common knowledge,” as Lewis calls it (e.g., Millikan, 1998; Moore, 2013; Skyrms,
1996). Common ground is usually defined in terms of belief: ϕ is common ground between us iff
you and I believe ϕ, each of us believes that the other believes that ϕ, each of us believes that the
other believes that the other believes that ϕ, and so on (Friedell, 1969; Lewis, 1969, pp. 52–60; Stal-
naker, 2002). This endless doxastic cascade has caused some scholars to fear that common ground,
thus defined, must be hard if not impossible to attain, and that therefore the concept is best aban-
doned altogether. However, for reasons explained already by Lewis himself, such fears are
unfounded. The critical point is that the doxastic cascade “is a chain of implications, not of steps in
anyone’s actual reasoning. Therefore there is nothing improper about its infinite length.” (Lewis,
1969, p. 53; for further discussion, see Lewis, 1969, pp. 52–60; Schiffer, 1972, pp. 30–36; Vander-
schraaf & Sillari, 2014.) In the following, I will argue that, without common ground, conventions
just could not work, so in this point I am with Lewis.
Second, according to Lewis, conventions are solutions to coordination problems. By definition,
a coordination problem is any situation that forces agents with broadly aligned interests into making
interdependent decisions that may result in more than one coordination equilibrium: a combination
of actions in which nobody would have been better off had any single else acted otherwise (Lewis,
1969, pp. 8–24). Lewis’s list of sample coordination problems mostly consists of such mundane
items as deciding where to meet, rowing a boat together, and dressing for a party. However,
although it is clear that we heavily rely on language to deal with our coordination problems, it does
not seem right to say that we address coordination problems whenever we use the word “bicycle,” a
falling intonation contour, or interrogative syntax. Therefore, as well as for reasons given by Milli-
kan (1998), Sugden (2005), Marmor (2009), and others, I hold that the purposes of conventions are
broader than Lewis makes them out to be. I do accept that conventions generally serve the purpose
of action coordination, but the concept of action coordination covers a wider range of situations than
what Lewis has in mind. For example, fashion in clothing is a form of action coordination which
may but need not solve a coordination problem (Davis, 2003). That said, although in the following I
will assume that conventions enable action coordination, my argument does not require that this be
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true. All it requires is that conventions serve purposes and in particular that, occasionally, several
conventions serve the same purpose; which should be uncontroversial.
Third and last, I agree with Millikan (1998), Davis (2003), Moore (2013), and others, who
argue against the idea that general conformity is an essential trait of conventions. General confor-
mity, be it de facto, de jure, or both, has often been taken to be a hallmark of conventions
(e.g., Bach & Harnish, 1979; Searle, 1969), and it figures conspicuously in Lewis’s analysis, too,
though eventually he weakens it somewhat so as to allow for the occasional exception. However,
there are plenty of cases to show that, weakened or not, general conformity is not mandatory. For
example, consider some of the more common ways of saying goodbye in English: “Good bye,”
“Bye,” “See you,” “See you later / soon / tomorrow / ...,” “Good night.” Each of these expressions
is conventionally employed to say goodbye, and although their usage conditions are not exactly the
same, there is so much overlap that a speaker will rarely if ever feel obliged to pick one rather than
any other.
More generally, the existence of synonyms and near-synonyms (“couch / sofa,” “large / big,”
“sad / blue,” “heart attack / myocardial infarction”) belies the claim that conventions are inherently
lawlike. For another example, consider the general availability of multiple media. If Donald wants
to inform his mother that he passed his driving test, he can choose to tell her face to face or on the
phone, he can write her a letter or email, leave a message on Twitter or Facebook, and so on. All of
these are conventional means of information sharing, and in most cases no single option is preferred
over all others, let alone mandatory.
Observations like these, which are easy to multiply, prove that conventions often fail to require
general conformity. The essential function of conventions is to enable action coordination; Lewisian
conventions are a special case in that they prescribe how a given coordination problem is to be
solved. Conventions may attain lawlike status in two ways. One is that it may be in everyone’s
interest that a convention should be followed by all; this is the type of case that Lewis was con-
cerned with, epitomised by the convention of driving on the right (or left, as the case may be).
Another possibility, not always disjoint with the first, is that conventions are enforced, institutionally
or otherwise; again, driving on the right is a case in point. I take it that the latter possibility is of sec-
ondary interest, and will confine my attention to the former.
Properly speaking, lawlike conventions are a species of enabling conventions, but in the follow-
ing it will be more convenient to use the two terms contrastively. Hence, I will employ “enabling”
as short for “merely enabling,” thus making “lawlike” and “enabling” mutually exclusive by fiat.
The distinction between lawlike and enabling conventions is an important one, because the two
affect our behaviour in very different ways. Lawlike conventions as it were impose themselves on
us: we stop at red and pay for groceries because we have to. By contrast, enabling conventions offer
themselves to us as possible ways of regulating our social interactions, and therefore they present us
with choices all the time: shall I say “hi” or “hello,” “big” or “large,” “sofa” or “couch”? In the fol-
lowing, I will argue that, whereas some types of linguistic convention are lawlike, others are merely
enabling, and that the latter include sense conventions which associate lexical forms with meanings
and sentence forms with speech acts. It naturally follows that, in general, sense conventions are a
source of indeterminacy, which interlocutors will have to contend with.
Whether lawlike or enabling, conventions are behavioural regularities. Suppose we are both in
London and have agreed to meet in Russell Square. This arrangement works well enough for both
of us that a convention establishes itself: whenever both of us are in London we meet in Russell
Square. Now at what point in our history of meetings did that convention come into existence?
There is no such point: our convention emerged gradually, so it is impossible to pin down its time
of birth; conventions are vague in this respect (cf. Davis, 2003; Moore, 2013). However, unless we
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explicitly agree to establish Russell Square as a standard coordination device, it is clear that after
our first meeting we did not have a convention going yet. One precedent does not suffice to make a
convention; for that, precedents need to have occurred often enough.
Conventions are social regularities of the past that enable us to shape our present behaviour; that
is what they are for. However, although one precedent does not make a convention, one precedent
may be enough to solve a problem in the present. To illustrate, let us conduct a thought experiment
(cf. Schelling, 1960; pp. 67–68, Lewis, 1969, p. 36). We take two people who have never met
before, introduce them to each other, and seat them in separate rooms, where they receive identical
instructions:
We ask you to pick one colour from the following: green, blue, red, and yellow. The
person next door is offered the same choice. If both of you pick the same colour, you
earn five euros each. If you pick different colours, you get nothing.
Suppose that our subjects strike lucky: purely by chance, they both choose blue, and thus receive €5
each. Then we repeat the experiment with the same subjects. Which colour will they pick this time?
It is a foregone conclusion that both will choose blue again, and this time each can be confident that
the other will do so, too.
On the first trial, our subjects solved their coordination problem by sheer luck. On the second
trial, they solved it on the strength of a single precedent, and in the absence of any convention,
thanks to the fact that, this time, one solution was uniquely salient. Here and in the following,
“salience” is a common ground concept: in order for it to enable coordination between us, a prece-
dent must be salient for us, as a team, and a precedent may be salient for a team without being
salient for each of its members severally. In the second trial of our thought experiment, for example,
though the colour blue was salient for our two subjects as a team, one or both may have been pri-
vately attending to another colour (see Schelling, 1960 and Mehta, Starmer, & Sugden, 1994 for
experimental evidence and discussion).
Single-precedent coordination is not restricted to thought experiments.
From the mid-1960s onwards, Glucksberg, Krauss, and colleagues con-
ducted a series of studies using a reference task in which participants had to
identify unusual figures designed to resist straightforward description
(e.g., Glucksberg, Krauss, & Weisberg, 1966; Krauss & Glucksberg, 1977).
In these experiments, speaker and hearer were separated by a barrier. The
speaker had before him a page showing a set of numbered figures
(an example is shown on the right); the hearer had a page with the same
figures, but arranged differently and without numbers. The task was for the
speaker to refer to each of the figures and give its number, so that the hearer could number it accord-
ingly. Since each figure appeared in several trials, this design made it possible to trace the emer-
gence and development of referential expressions within a short time frame.
People turn out to be remarkably good at this task. Speakers readily produce impromptu labels
like “hourglass” or “cup” to refer to the figure above, and often enough their partners immediately
copy them on subsequent trials. In some cases, participants need more than one trial to agree on a
label, as the following sequence of trials illustrates (Krauss & Glucksberg, 1977):
Looks like an hourglass with legs on each side ... hourglass with the legs ... hourglass-
shaped thing ... hourglass ... hourglass ... hourglass.
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But even so, it seldom takes more than a handful of trials for participants to converge on a label,
and quite often labels are established instantaneously.
In the Glucksberg/Krauss experiments, participants were faced with coordination problems that
could be solved in many different ways, as was attested by the variety of speakers’ productions.
However, one solution might be particularly salient because it happened to work on a previous trial,
and if such a solution presented itself, it would tend to be reused. Outside the psychology lab,
salient precedents are usually provided by conventions. We call a spade a “spade” because that is
how spades have been called often enough, and frequency of occurrence promotes salience. But
obviously, the emergence of a convention necessarily involves a run-up period, during which the
salience of precedents was not yet due to their frequency.
Thus, the following picture suggests itself. We may coordinate our actions by means of prece-
dents provided they are sufficiently salient. A linguistic device can be salient because it has occurred
recently enough and with a certain minimum regularity, in which case there is a convention in place.
But as we have seen, even a single occurrence may suffice to make a precedent salient. Either way,
in order to understand how communicative and other social interactions of the past inform present
ones, we are well advised to first investigate the kinematics of precedent-based coordination. Which
is what we will do shortly; but first some preliminaries are in order.
3 | UTTERANCES
Utterances are commonly understood as actions involving the delivery of a sentence, and though it
is seldom denied that productions of sub-sentential expressions are utterances, too, in general not
much importance seems to be attached to this fact. However, since my objective in this paper is to
analyse the conventionality of words, syntactic constructions, and so on, I need to stress that the
action of uttering a complex expression never comes alone. If A tells B,
1. Theresa is fond of grass,
then in a normal run of events, A’s utterance serves to inform B that Theresa is fond of grass. But
part of A’s utterance is an utterance of the proper name “Theresa,” which helps A and B to
get aligned on a goat named “Theresa,” say, and likewise each of the other words is uttered singly
as part of A’s utterance of (1). And that is not the end of it, for in the process of uttering (1), A also
utters the verb phrase “is fond of grass,” the adjectival phrase “fond of grass,” and the prepositional
phrase “of grass.”
I take it that these observations are unobjectionable, but they are more significant than is gener-
ally realised. An utterance of a sentence is an intentional action with a communicative purpose, and
when the action aims to be cooperative, it will license the kind of pragmatic inferences that Grice
(1975) dubbed “conversational implicatures.” The exact same thing holds true of utterances of
words: they are actions with communicative purposes, which are generally cooperative, and there-
fore give rise to Gricean inferences (though I recommend not to call such inferences “conversational
implicatures,” so as to forestall terminological confusion). Seen this way, communication is Gricean
from the lexical level up, and the embattled boundary between pragmatics at and below the sentence
level is of relatively little interest (see Geurts, 2010, pp. 182–187 for further discussion).
Bearing in mind that utterances need not be utterances of sentences also helps to see how we
can approach Lewis’s problem of the relation between language and languages. We can view words,
quite abstractly, as pairings of forms and meanings, which in and of themselves are not
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conventional. However, words may serve to individuate utterances, and since utterances are actions,
and actions can be conventional, we can make sense of the notion that a word is conventionally
used in this or that way. The same, mutatis mutandis, for syntactic categories and constructions,
intonation contours, and so on. This idea will be developed further in the following sections.
Another aspect of utterances that bears emphasising is that, to a very large degree, they are joint
projects between interlocutors.1 It has been observed that, in spoken dialogue, speakers often take
turns in mid-sentence, as in the following attested example (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986):
2. A: That tree has, uh, uh, ...
B: tentworms.
A: Yeah.
B: Yeah.
Interactions like this are common, and demonstrate the extent to which interlocutors are able to col-
laborate so as to achieve successful communication. In the exchange in (2), it is A who asserts that
the tree under discussion has tent worms, but somewhat paradoxically, his assertion is the result of a
collaborative effort; in a sense, A and B establish together what A says.
Let us develop this point a bit further. Suppose that A and B agree, wrongly, that the author of
Lolita was Vyacheslav Molotov. Now A says:
3. The author of Lolita was born in 1890.
Since it is common ground between A and B that Molotov was the author of Lolita, A’s utterance
means for them that Molotov was born in 1890 (which happens to be true). As far as A and B are
concerned, “the author of Lolita” successfully refers to Molotov, and A’s utterance of (3) success-
fully informs B that Molotov was born in 1890. That A and B are wrong about the facts is neither
here nor there.
Now A finds that Lolita wasn’t written by Molotov after all, but sadly he still gets things wrong:
for reasons we need not go into here, he has come to believe that Sergei Prokofiev (b. 1891) is the
author, and he corrects his earlier statement accordingly:
4. The author of Lolita was born in 1891.
While communication was successful in the first case, this time something has gone seriously awry:
A intends to refer to Prokofiev and B takes him to be referring to Molotov. To make matters worse,
A knows that B will take him to be referring to Molotov. A and B fail to agree on the reference of
“the author of Lolita,” and therefore communication has failed.
These two cases illustrate that reference is not determined by the speaker alone but by what is
common ground between interlocutors. In the first case, it was common ground between A and B
that Molotov wrote Lolita, and reference was successful. In the second case, reference failed because
they disagreed about the authorship and only A was aware that they did.2 The same holds, mutatis
mutandis, for meaning. If it is common ground between A and B that “molybdenum” and “wolfram”
1 In this and the following paragraphs, I will be merely scratching the surface of a theme discussed at much greater length by Clark
(1992, 1996).
2 Some philosophers would claim that, as a matter of fact, the referent of “the author of Lolita” is the same in both cases, viz. Vladi-
mir Nabokov. This view strikes me as dubious, at the best of times (cf. Geurts, 1997), but that is as it may be, since I am concerned
with communication rather than the metaphysics of reference.
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are synonymous, then the fact that their usage disagrees with the experts’ will not prevent them from
communicating successfully about what they take to be a single metal.
The upshot of these observations is that, at the end of the day, reference and meaning are deter-
mined neither by the speaker’s intentions nor by the conventions of the interlocutors’ national lan-
guage, but by their common beliefs about the worldly and linguistic facts. It seems likely that
interlocutors’ common beliefs about language and the world will predominantly agree with their pri-
vate beliefs and the beliefs of the larger communities they belong to. But wherever they disagree, it
is the common ground that prevails. Precedents and conventions outside the common ground are
communicatively inert.
4 | PRECEDENTS
With these preliminaries out of the way, let us turn to precedents. The basic idea is simple enough:
if it is common ground between interlocutors that a given expression or construction α has previ-
ously been used (by themselves or others) for a particular purpose p, then in principle α may be
reused for the same purpose. Precedents are past actions that will serve as templates for present
ones. In principle, it does not matter how often α has been used to achieve p, though popular prece-
dents are more likely to be reused. Even so, as we have seen, one precedent may be enough, pro-
vided it is sufficiently salient.
I distinguish between two types of utterances: speech acts and alignments. I will not try to define
what speech acts are, since for my current purposes it is not necessary to take a stance on that issue
(but see Geurts, 2017, In press). All I need to assume here is that utterances may serve to inform,
request, ask, and so on, that it is an essential part of linguistic communication to establish what
speech acts are being performed, and that a single utterance may serve to perform several speech
acts at once; an utterance of “It’s cold outside,” for example, may count as a warning and a reminder
at the same time. None of these assumptions should be particularly controversial.
If speech acts are the princesses of linguistic interaction, alignments are their handmaidens. Their
purpose is joint attention. If I utter the name “John,” for example, then I am trying to get us aligned
on a particular individual I have in mind. More generally, an expression α serves to align speaker
and hearer on an entity of α’s semantic type. Thus, if our semantic theory of choice stipulates that
declarative sentences express propositions, then an utterance of “It’s cold outside” will usually serve
to align the interlocutors on the proposition that it is cold outside. (“Usually,” because an utterance
may fail to get the interlocutors aligned on anything.) I assume that, with respect to alignments,
monosemy is the norm; that is to say, no utterance may serve to align interlocutors on more than
one semantic object at a time. Therefore, an utterance of “It’s cold outside” usually serves to align
the interlocutors on a single proposition. However, note that this does not rule out the possibility
that the same utterance serves to perform a speech act, or several. For example, “It’s cold outside”
typically expresses the proposition that it is cold outside and may at the same time be a statement, a
reminder, and a warning.
To make these ideas more concrete, let us introduce the following toy syntax. “John snores” is
parsed as S:[N:John, V:snores], where S is the category of declarative sentences, and N and V sub-
sume proper names and intransitive verbs, respectively. Small capitals are used to represent semantic
entities: JOHN43 and JOHN76 are distinct individuals; SNORE is a concept, which combines with an indi-
vidual to yield a proposition (e.g., SNORE(JOHN43)); and REMIND and WARN are speech acts, which we
model as relations between speakers, hearers, and propositions. Last, we introduce the following
shorthand notation:
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Pt(α,x) : = at t an utterance of α enabled interlocutors to align on x, where t is a time in
the past.
Hence, 9tPt(N:John, JOHN43) is short for: “Some time ago, an utterance of the name “John”
enabled interlocutors to align on JOHN43.”
Now we can give a very simple model to illustrate how precedents interact so as to enable com-
munication between two individuals A and B:
5. It is common ground between A and B that:
a. 9tPt(N:John, JOHN43).
b. 9tPt(N:John, JOHN76).
c. 9tPt(V:snores, SNORE).
d. 9tPt(S:[N:α,V:β],c(x)), for some individual x and concept c such that Pt0(N:α,x) and
Pt0 0(V:β,c), for some t0, t00 prior to t.
e. 9t: S:[...] served to REMIND at t that p, where Pt(S:[...], p).
f. 9t: S:[...] served to WARN at t that p, where Pt(S:[...], p).
Each of the clauses in (5) states that there is at least one precedent for using a given word or con-
struction in a certain way. All this is common ground between A and B, and to keep things as sim-
ple as possible we assume that there are no further precedents in the common ground; that is to say,
it is common belief between A and B that there are only two types of precedent for utterances of
“John,” only one type for utterances of “snores,” and so on.
In contrast to the lexical precedents in (5a–c), the precedent in (5d) involves a grammatical con-
struction. (5d) says that, at some t in the past, a sentence S occurred consisting of a name α and a
verb β; that α and β had served, before t, to align interlocutors on an individual x and a concept c,
respectively; and that S served at t to align interlocutors on the proposition c(x). Note that this prece-
dent overlaps with the ones in (5e) and (5f ), which specify that declarative sentences have been
used to issue a reminder and a warning, respectively.
Now suppose A utters “John snores,” and suppose furthermore that the interpretation of A’s
utterance is constrained solely by the precedents in (5), and that B is entitled to assume that A is
performing a speech act. Then B is presented with two choices: she must decide (i) whether the rele-
vant precedent for “John” is (5a) or (5b), and (ii) which of (5e) and (5f ) are the precedents for A’s
uttering “John snores” (recall that an utterance may count as several speech acts at once). Hence,
there are six possible readings for A’s utterance of “John snores”; that is to say, six ways of linking
that utterance and its constituent utterances to the precedents in (5):
• REMIND(A, B, SNORE(JOHN43))
• REMIND(A, B, SNORE (JOHN76))
• WARN(A, B, SNORE(JOHN43))
• WARN(A, B, SNORE (JOHN76))
• REMIND(A, B, SNORE(JOHN43)) and WARN(A, B, SNORE(JOHN43))
• REMIND(A, B, SNORE(JOHN76)) and WARN(A, B, SNORE(JOHN76))
Note that the precedents in (5c) and (5d) are implicated in each of these readings.
The model in (5) was designed to capture, on a small scale, some of the ambiguities that are
endemic to natural language: as a rule, a name has many bearers and any grammatical mood can be
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used to perform many different speech acts. These and other types of ambiguity combine to generate
a multitude of candidate readings for even the simplest utterance. To a large degree, this explosion
is contained by the fact that precedents outside the common ground can be discarded. For example,
although it is a fact, and A and B may be aware, that there are millions of Johns in this world, only
two of them are in their common ground, which radically reduces the indeterminacy of A’s utter-
ing “John.”
Nonetheless, ambiguities remain, and even in the simplest cases they add up, as our example
shows. Fortunately, we manage to resolve these ambiguities, more often than not, homing in on that
reading which stands out as the most likely one, given the discourse purposes and other contextual
factors. Here, too, common ground plays a key role, for in general, there will be mutual agreement
on what is the best way of resolving a given ambiguity. For example, if JOHN43 is the current topic
of conversation, and A utters the name “John,” then it will be common ground between A and B
that JOHN43 is the most likely referent. Therefore, B is entitled to assume that A’s utterance targeted
JOHN43, it is common ground that she is so entitled, and by the same token, A is committed to having
targeted JOHN43, regardless what his referential intentions were. For another example, suppose it is
common ground that B did not know that John snores. Then within the scenario of (5), it is common
ground that A’s utterance of “John snores” cannot be a reminder. Therefore, it is common ground
that B is entitled to suppose that A’s utterance serves to warn, not to remind, and by the same token,
A is committed to having issued a warning, not a reminder.
Thus, the common ground enables the use of precedents in at least two ways. First, it restricts
the range of precedents eligible for speakers to emulate, without which the number of candidate pre-
cedents would generally be too large to be manageable. Second, the common ground allows inter-
locutors to negotiate their way out of any remaining ambiguities, by supporting abductive inferences
about the preferred ways of resolving indeterminacies. Without common ground, precedent-based
interaction would be unthinkable.
5 | FROM PRECEDENTS TO CONVENTIONS
The model in (5) illustrates how words and constructions help to individuate and guide the combina-
torics of the precedents underpinning linguistic communication. Conventions are not part of the pic-
ture yet, but it will not be hard to see where they come in. As things currently stand, neither the
recency of a precedent nor the frequency with which it has occurred can affect the likelihood that it
will be copied. Therefore, a single deviant use of a word in the distant past will continue to compete
with what has long become its dominant use. Clearly, we must keep track of when and how often a
given type of precedent has occurred, and I take it that this is what speakers do. So we need prece-
dent types, which we may think of as sets of precedents. (This is admittedly crude, but it will do.)
Conventions can then be defined as a special kind of precedent type:
6. If R is a precedent type all of whose instances served the same purpose p, then R is a con-
vention in a population P iff R has been instantiated often enough and recently enough that it
is a salient way of achieving p for the members of P.
Obviously, this is a sketchy definition at best, if only because it contains several vague terms; but
that is the nature of the beast. Precedence is the key notion; conventions merely occupy a vague
region in precedent space. The main idea underlying (6) is simply that the salience of a precedent
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type varies with the recency and frequency of its instances, and the more salient a precedent type is,
the more strongly it suggests itself as a coordination device.
To illustrate this idea, let PJ be a precedent type corresponding to (5a), that is, a set of past utter-
ances of the proper name “John” that enabled interlocutors to align on JOHN43. Suppose that PJ con-
tains sufficiently many utterances that are recent enough to render it salient to A and B that uttering
“John” is a way of aligning on JOHN43. Then according to (6), uttering “John” is a conventional
method, between A and B, for aligning on JOHN43. In the same way, the remaining clauses in (5) map
to candidate conventions between A and B. I call such conventions “sense conventions,” and divide
them, along the same line as precedents, into alignment conventions and speech act conventions.
As defined in (6), it is sufficient for conventionhood that a precedent type enables a course of
action. Lawlike conventions of the kind analysed by Lewis are special cases, which emerge when it is
in the interest of all to adopt the same pattern of behaviour. Sense conventions are typically (merely)
enabling. By contrast, many language conventions are Lewisian. In English, articles must sit at the left
periphery of the noun phrase, subjects and finite verbs must agree in person and number, a syllable
onset must have at most three consonants, and so on. Such form conventions are quite different from
sense conventions, and it is not entirely obvious what they are for. I conjecture that their main purpose
is merely to curtail the vast number of forms speakers and hearers would otherwise have to cope with.
For example, if any old combination of English phonemes counted as a syllable of English, the num-
ber of potential syllables would be prohibitively large. Thankfully, phonotactic conventions reduce that
number dramatically, thus making it humanly possible to produce and parse syllables.3
If this conjecture is on the right track, form conventions may be seen as coordination devices, too,
but whereas the purpose of sense conventions is to enable interlocutors to coordinate on content, the
purpose of form conventions is to coordinate on a shared pool of eligible expressions. This is why
form conventions tend to require general conformity. Form conventions are metaconventions in the
sense that, by curtailing admissible forms, they constrain the range of possible sense conventions.
6 | SENSE CONVENTIONS
To return to sense conventions, let us compare and contrast the two main varieties distinguished in
the foregoing. Traditionally, the study of (what I call) alignment conventions has been segregated
from the study of speech act conventions, which may have fostered the impression that they have lit-
tle if anything in common. In this section, I argue, however, that the two types of conventions are
similar, and that even if speech acts and alignments are very different types of action, the ways in
which they are negotiated are much alike. In order to bring home this point I will focus on the paral-
lels between lexical alignments and speech acts, following Asher and Lascarides (2001).
To begin with, in lexical alignments as well as in speech acts, content is underdetermined by
form. Lexical indeterminacies are positively virulent. Practically, all words in everyday use have
more than one sense that is common ground throughout large parts of the language community. The
same holds for grammatical moods, prosody, and other “force-indicating devices,” as Searle (1969)
calls them: on any given occasion, the linguistic form of an utterance constrains but does not deter-
mine its speech act(s), just as the form of a word constrains but does not determine its contextual
meaning. The mere fact that a handful of grammatical moods suffice to perform an indefinite variety
of speech acts betrays the extent of the indeterminacy.
3 To make this more concrete: if the 40-odd phonemes of English were allowed to combine freely, we would get 240 biphonemic
combinations, 340 triphonemic combinations, and so on. These are frighteningly large numbers. Phonotactic constraints leave some-
thing on the order of 15,000 syllables in actual use.
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Second, the various senses of a word are typically related. It is no accident that the word
“table,” for example, may refer to a piece of furniture with a flat top, a group sharing a table, vari-
ous kinds of flat surfaces, and so on. Similarly, the word “school” has a variety of conventional
senses interconnected by world knowledge:
Our school is ...
... on holiday. (staff/students)
... on the list of institutions currently being reviewed by the Department of Education.
(institution)
... on fire. (building)
In like manner, a declarative sentence may be used to issue a variety of interrelated speech acts:
statements, promises, threats, warnings, complaints, and so on. Hence, the declarative mood is poly-
semous in much the same way as the bulk of the lexicon is.
It is important to note, pace Pustejovsky (1995) and others, that even if polysemy is in many
ways a regular phenomenon, the semantic lexicon is not a purely generative system; for derived
senses may have to be sanctioned by convention (Briscoe & Copestake, 1999; Copestake, 2012;
Nunberg, 2004). Nunberg lists several cases that illustrate this point: in French, but not in English,
names of fruits may be used to refer to the brandies made from them (“une poire,” “une prune”); in
Russian, but not in English, the name of an organ may denote a disease of that organ; and while in
English, the same noun may generally be used for an animal and its meat, in Greenlandic Eskimo
this is not permitted, rendering the equivalent of “I don’t eat walrus” infelicitous. Lexical meaning
shifts are enabled by world knowledge: from an established word sense, a related sense that is suffi-
ciently salient may be derived. But still, the derivation may have to be licensed by convention.
The same is true of speech acts. Like lexical meanings, speech acts perforce require linguistic
vehicles to be conveyed: grammatical constructions, particles, prosodic patterns, and so on; and
there are conventional restrictions on what form is suitable for what purpose. A request like “Would
you be so kind to peel the potatoes?” is generally an acceptable way of inviting the addressee to peel
the potatoes, but it would be out of place in a recipe, even if it might be perfectly intelligible. When
it comes to giving instructions, bare imperatives are the norm. Similarly, while the Dutch translitera-
tion of “You are Agnes or not?” is a licit tag question, in English it is not, though the speaker’s
meaning might be clear enough. As in the case of lexical polysemy, even if the intended meaning of
a linguistic vehicle is fully transparent, it may have to be sanctioned by convention.
Once a derived lexical sense has conventionalised, it often remains transparent that it is a derived
sense. For example, though it is fully conventional to measure lengths in “feet,” the mensural sense
of the word “foot” is clearly derived from its anatomical sense. The relation between an indirect
speech act and its source is similar. As has often been observed, the requestive use of “Could you
pass me the salt?” obviously derives from its interrogative use, and though both uses are conven-
tional, the derivational link remains transparent. In fact, the same form can function as a question
and a request at the same time, as is shown by the fact that the addressee may respond by saying,
“Yes, of course,” while giving the salt, thus answering the question and heeding the request at the
same time. Given our assumption that one utterance may count as several speech acts at once, this
is to be expected. By contrast, having assumed that, for alignments, monosemy is the norm, we pre-
dict that it is unusual for a word to have two senses at the same time, which, barring puns, seems to
be correct.
As described by Millikan (1998, p. 176), a language is “a tangled jungle of overlapping, criss-
crossing traditional patterns,” with ambiguities springing up where patterns overlap. The picture is
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apt, and it highlights the importance of common ground, for it is hard to see how we could find our
way around Millikan’s jungle of multifarious and interrelated meanings without a shared basis
enabling us to align on the same meaning most of the time. However, being at pains to play up the
continuity between us and the rest of the animal kingdom, Millikan herself chooses to eradicate all
“intellectualist” notions from her account of human communication, and that includes common
ground (cf. also Skyrms, 1996). This leaves her theory with serious explanatory gaps. Most strik-
ingly (and ironically), it fails to explain how hearers manage to cope with the rampant ambiguities
caused by the very “crisscrossing conventions” that Millikan herself lays so much emphasis on. All
she has to say on this matter is that hearers sort out ambiguities “by one means or another” (1998,
p. 176), and without any notion of common ground, there is little more for her to say.
On my account, conventions and common ground intersect in various ways, one of which is
especially important in the present context: the common ground constrains the range of conventions
that might be relevant for the ongoing interaction. Onomastic conventions provide a particularly
vivid case in point. As noted before, there are millions of individuals called “John”; that is several
million of sense conventions which associate that name with an specific boy, man, baboon, or what
have you. The remarkable fact that my uttering “John” enables us to align on the same individual
can only be explained by supposing that we winnow down that vast set to those individuals in our
common ground who go by the name of “John,” and then pick out whomever we agree to be the
best candidate, that is, the best candidate according to our common ground. And so it goes with
sense conventions in general. To reject the notion of common ground is to give up on explaining
even the most basic forms of communication.
Following Lewis, I have taken the view that conventions are, first and foremost, regularities in
social interaction. This leaves out of account the fact that conventions seem to be normative in some
sense (not to be confused with the notion that speech acts may be normative in some sense; see Kis-
sine, 2013, pp. 158–161, Ball, 2014). But how could a mere regularity be normative? The discussion
of the last paragraph suggests an answer. When I utter the word “table,” then in many cases you
thereby become entitled to suppose that I am trying to get us aligned on the TABLE concept, that is to
say, the concept of a piece of furniture with a flat surface for eating, writing, and so on; and by the
same token, I become committed to trying to get us thus aligned. However, as I have been stressing,
the same word is involved in other sense conventions, too. The convention of using “table” to mean
TABLE becomes normative in some contexts only. These are contexts in which it is common ground
between us that (i) this convention is available, and (ii) this use allows us to make better sense of
my utterance than any other for which the common ground offers precedents (conventional or not).
If, and only if, these conditions are met, it is common ground between us that you are entitled to
interpret my utterance of “table” as a bid to align on the TABLE concept, and my commitment is sim-
ply the obverse of your entitlement. In the same way, my uttering, “Does your dog bite?” will typi-
cally (though not invariably) commit me to having a wish for information, and entitle you to assume
that I have that wish.
On this view, sense conventions are not intrinsically normative. What normativity they seem to
have depends entirely on the context, consisting as it does of the commitments and entitlements
flowing from the common ground via abduction.
7 | CONCLUSION
People are social animals in constant need of having to coordinate their actions. To a very large
degree, they manage to do so by reusing solutions that worked before, for themselves or others. Like
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all animals, we are creatures of habit, but the sheer variety of our social interactions force us to be
more flexible than most. Each of us enters the social arena with a stockpile of memories of past
interactions, clustered into criss-crossing types and subtypes; these are the precedents we draw upon
for coordinating our actions. In essence, this is Lewis’s picture, which I have developed in two main
ways: by dropping his stipulation that conventions require general conformity, and by drawing on
the notion of common ground even more heavily than Lewis did. Thus, it became possible to
account for a seemingly simple fact that eluded Lewis’s analysis, namely, that words, constructions,
intonation contours, and other linguistic devices are conventional means for coordinating our com-
municative interactions.
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